Impact Stories

Understanding air pollution risks: Case study of haze in Singapore

Effective communication of air pollution risks key to prompting public action

25 October 2021

Ambient (outdoor) air pollution is one of the biggest environmental risk factors contributing to leading causes of death, including heart disease, stroke, lung cancer and other respiratory diseases[i]. With 9 out of 10 people breathing in polluted air globally, this silent killer contributed to an estimated 7 million premature deaths in 2016 according to the World Health Organization[ii].

In addition to the main sources of air pollution found globally, such as vehicle exhaust, industry and energy production emissions, Southeast Asia is also afflicted by biomass burning like in forest fires. This is another dominant contributor to poor air quality especially in rural areas[iii].  Forest wildfires during the dry season and slash-and-burn practices for agriculture not only affect local air quality, but also lead to recurring haze pollution in the region affecting multiple countries. Research has linked haze exposure to acute disease and death[iv]; in particular, a study found that the 2015 Southeast Asian haze crisis led to over 100,000 premature deaths in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore[v].

Communicating the risks of air pollution effectively is crucial to prompting the public to take appropriate protective measures. Effective communication could directly impact a person’s decision to wear a mask or avoid outdoor activities during hazy conditions, for example. Moreover, when people are more aware of the level of air pollution they are exposed to, they may put pressure on policy-makers to address the issue and monitor the effectiveness of controls. Such involvement could go a long way towards managing air pollution and its health impacts.

By examining Singapore and its haze episodes, we could gain insights into how local communities respond to communication strategies for air pollution, and learn how we can better convey risk information.

Haze in Singapore

Singapore’s intermittent “haze seasons” over the last five decades are largely due to forest fires in Indonesia. These fires are often associated with wildfires on flammable drained peatlands during the dry season, or biomass burning for agriculture, as in the case of the 2013 haze crisis where palm oil companies cleared massive tracts of land through burning. That said, it was only in the recent decade, specifically during the 2013 haze event, that Singapore saw major transformations in its risk communication landscape.

Monitoring and providing air pollution data is only the first, yet fundamental, step towards effective risk communication. Although a quantified indicator, the amount of data accessible from the Pollutant Standards Index (PSI) introduced in 1991, was highly limited until the 2013 haze crisis. More indicators were reported, and the frequency of updates was increased to an hourly basis towards the peak of the haze episode from 20 June 2013 onwards. Thus, the public was able to understand the severity of the 2013 haze crisis, especially when the PSI peaked at record-breaking levels of 401. That marked the first time air quality in Singapore had entered the “hazardous” range.

The public could access PSI updates most notably through the National Environment Agency’s (NEA) Twitter account and website, and other media including traditional media platforms, social media, and smartphone applications.

Next, general health advisories based on the primary indicator (PSI) were crucial in equipping the public with the knowledge to interpret the PSI readings properly and act accordingly. These advisories were often disseminated alongside the haze forecasts and updates through the aforementioned channels, as well as through tailored guidelines to specific stakeholders from various agencies in the Haze Task Force such as through circulars to schools from the Ministry of Education.

These measures and channels form the basis of Singapore’s communication strategy and ensures that critical information about haze risk mitigation behaviour would reach a diverse array of stakeholders, and yet be tailored to what different target audiences consider relevant.

(Over) perception of risk?

How then did Singaporeans react to the risk information during the 2013 haze crisis? On one hand, they understood the haze advisories well, as seen from how many stayed indoors, and the increased use of air-conditioning during haze episodes.[vi] However, public anxiety spiked especially on days when PSI readings hit “very unhealthy” and “hazardous” levels.[vii] Furthermore, amplification of risks occurred through social media posts with negative sentiments (e.g. sadness and anger) during the 2013 haze crisis intensified individuals’ concerns and fear, and increased their perceived risk of the haze.[viii] Most notably, widespread panic buying of N95 masks led to an islandwide shortage, and even online scalping.

While it was right to treat the haze as a severe health risk, could the public have been perceiving too much of it? This incident shows that risk communication needs to go beyond raising public awareness about health risks and preventive measures associated with air pollution— it should seek to minimise panic at the same time, and encourage the public to take measured steps to address the risk.

Finding a balance: how much information does the public require?

Following the 2013 haze crisis, the region undertook improvements in its risk communication: there was greater data sharing among the ASEAN states, and more organisations provided air quality information. Consequently, individuals have become increasingly exposed to different types and sources of information. In Singapore, some individuals perceive the PSI system, specifically the aggregated nature of its data, to be inadequate. They argue that the readings do not correspond to the smell or visible signs of the haze, and consequently called for one-hour PSI readings. NEA’s objection to this request prompted them to turn to alternative websites providing one-hour readings. However, as more online users refer to alternative air quality readings, more are questioning why NEA’s PSI differs from other readings, giving rise to questions of trust and perceived reliability of official sources.

Faced with the increasing ease of access to various alternative sources, policymakers have to contend with how such information should be managed to remain sufficient and not confuse individuals. Is more information necessarily better? Some could perceive multiple alternative sources to be distracting, while others might see their potential in better informing the public of the haze situation. Whichever stance a policymaker might take, a more crucial takeaway here is that it is necessary for communication to be two-way and reciprocal. Simply disseminating information and then dismissing the worries of the public as “misconceptions” could leave them dissatisfied. On the contrary, it might be more meaningful to establish dialogue between “experts” and the “layman”. For instance, experts could learn how the public rationalises information, and the public could be guided to deal with conflicting sources of information in a better way.

Communicating actions that reflect a holistic understanding of risks?

Studies on the media’s portrayal of haze in Singapore noted a shift from discussing the health impacts of haze to an increased vilifying of the oil palm industry and companies in Indonesia over time.[ix] In Singapore, the non-governmental organization (NGO) PM Haze, which emerged during the 2015 haze event, communicates the risks of haze to the public with the intention of advocating sustainable consumption. Individuals have increasingly mentioned actions that transcend the wearing of masks and staying indoors, to boycotting and holding companies responsible for the causes of haze in the region – burning of peat lands.

This trend possibly reflects a greater and arguably more holistic public understanding of the risks associated with haze, as individuals are going beyond stop-gap measures (personal protection e.g. wearing masks) that address the effects, to seeking actions that tackle the cause. Thus, a further point to consider is: what is an appropriate level of action that could be communicated for individuals to address the risks of air pollution? In countries where the causes of air pollution are largely domestic (e.g. coal combustion for energy production), potential civic action might mean that local authorities will be more reluctant to make air quality data public. In this case, it is crucial to begin by improving risk understanding among policy-makers and convincing relevant authorities about the importance of disclosing air pollution information to the public.

Key lessons from Singapore

So, what can we learn from a small tropical island state covered by hazy skies from time to time? Some areas which Singapore has done well in include: relatively good public access to current and historical air quality data which can be found on a one-stop haze portal (haze.gov.sg), clear and simple guidance on what individuals should do during different haze pollution levels, and its leveraging of digital technology i.e Twitter and phone applications that are easily accessible and widely used.

Coordinating the provision of useful and accessible data is an essential aspect of any risk communication strategy, and thus Singapore’s experience could be applicable to other cities that experience air pollution.

Firstly, this case study exemplified the potential of using multiple platforms for risk communications, while also highlighting its complications. While diversifying the platforms used enables the relevant authorities to reach out to people of different demographics, it also requires more effort to tackle misinformation, especially on the Internet, and to promptly respond to public queries and concerns.

Secondly, being exposed to huge amounts of data could affect individuals’ trust in official sources and lead to disputes over the reliability of various sources. Different cities might come to their own conclusions about the level of information required, platforms used, and intended action from individuals. Nonetheless, communication about air pollution should provide individuals with timely access to quality information to assist them in their decision-making.

References

[i] Hannah Ritchie (2017) – “Air Pollution”. Our World in Data. Retrieved from: ‘https://ourworldindata.org/air-pollution’ [Online Resource]

[ii] World Health Organization. 2018. “9 out of 10 people worldwide breathe polluted air, but more countries are taking action.” https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/02-05-2018-9-out-of-10-people-worldwide-breathe-polluted-air-but-more-countries-are-taking-action.

[iii] UNEP. n.d. The Southeast Asia Air Quality Regional Report. Retrieved from: https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/report/south-east-asia-air-quality-regional-report

[iv] Cheong, Ngiam, Morgan, Pek, Tan, Lai, . . . Ho. (2019). Acute health impacts of the southeast asian transboundary haze Problem—A review. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 16(18), 3286. doi:10.3390/ijerph16183286. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6765769/

[v] Koplitz, S. N., Mickley, L. J., Marlier, M. E., Buonocore, J. J., Kim, P. S., Liu, T., . . . Myers, S. S. (2016). Public health impacts of the severe haze in equatorial asia in September–October 2015: Demonstration of a new framework for informing fire management strategies to reduce downwind smoke exposure. Environmental Research Letters, 11(9), 094023.

doi:10.1088/1748-9326/11/9/094023.https://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/11/9/094023

[vi] Velasco, E. & Rastan, S. (2015). Air quality in Singapore during the 2013 smoke-haze episode over the Strait of Malacca: Lessons learned. Sustainable Cities and Society. 17. 10.1016/j.scs.2015.04.006.

[vii] Sheldon, T.L. & Sankaran, C, 2019. “Averting Behavior Among Singaporeans During Indonesian Forest Fires,” Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer; European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 74(1), pages 159-180, September.

[viii] Chong, M., Choy, M., 2018. The Social Amplification of Haze-Related Risks on the Internet. Health Communication 33, 14–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/10410236.2016.1242031

[ix] Trisha T. C. Lin & John Robert Bautista (2016) Predicting Intention to Take Protective Measures During Haze: The Roles of Efficacy, Threat, Media Trust, and Affective Attitude, Journal of Health Communication, 21:7, 790-799, DOI: 10.1080/10810730.2016.1157657. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10810730.2016.1157657

Other references:

Lang et al. (2001). Risk Communication. Water Quality: Guidelines, Standards and Health. https://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/dwq/iwachap14.pdf?ua=1

Ellis, L. D. (2018). The Need for Effective Risk Communication Strategies in Today’s Complex Information Environment. https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/ecpe/effective-risk-communication-strategies/

Guillemin, M. (2017). Design of Air Quality Communication Tools from around the World. https://marroninstitute.nyu.edu/blog/design-of-air-quality-communication-tools-from-around-the-world